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ABSTRACT 
Usage and Diffusion of Cellular Telephony, 1998-2004* 
by Michał Grajek† and Tobias Kretschmer‡ 
In this paper, we study the dynamics of usage intensity of second-generation 
cellular telephony over the diffusion curve.  We address two specific questions:  
First, does information about usage intensity over time allow us to draw 
conclusions about the underlying drivers of technology diffusion?  Seconds, 
what effect does the existence and penetration of previous generations and 
other networks in the same generation on network usage intensity?  Using an 
operator-level panel covering 41 countries with quarterly data over 6 years, we 
find that heterogeneity among adopters dominates network effects and that 
different technological generations are complements in terms of usage, but 
substitutes in terms of subscription. 
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fixed-mobile substitutability 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Gebrauch und Infusion von Mobilfunktelefonie, 1998-2004 
In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die Dynamik der Gebrauchsintensität von 
Mobilfunktelekommunikation zweiter Generation (D-Netzwerk in Deutschland) in 
verschiedenen Phasen ihrer Marktdiffusion. Wir stellen zwei spezifische Fragen: 
Erstens, kann man an Hand der Informationen über die Gebrauchsintensität die 
zugrundeliegenden Treiber der Technologiediffusion identifizieren? Zweitens, 
welche Auswirkung haben die Existenz und die Marktdurchdringung der 
vorherigen Generationen und andere Netzwerke derselben Generation auf die 
Gebrauchsintensität eines Mobilfunknetzwerks? Mittels der Paneldaten auf 
Netzwerkbetreiberebene, die 41 Nationen vierteljährlich über 6 Jahre 
umspannen,  finden wir, dass die Abonnentenheterogenität die Netzwerkeffekte 
dominiert. Außerdem stellt sich heraus, dass die unterschiedlichen 
Technologiegenerationen bezüglich der Gebrauchsintensität komplementär 
zueinander sind, jedoch bezüglich ihrer Subskription Substituten darstellen. 
 
I Introduction 
In this paper, we study the dynamics of usage intensity in the context of second-generation 
cellular telephony. This is fairly unique as most other studies on the success of new products 
or technologies look only at diffusion speed (i.e. the slope of an s-shaped diffusion curve) and 
maximum market size (i.e. the asymptotic value of adopters) as key indicators for 
technological success. One can think of many reasons why technologies should diffuse in an 
s-shape, and researchers have developed a large number of diffusion models that generate the 
same s-shaped outcome. In cellular telephony, diffusion in various geographical markets has 
been widely documented and analysed. In particular, many papers emphasize the importance 
of network effects in cellular telephony (Doganoglu and Grzybowski, 2005; Grajek, 2003, 
Liikanen et al., 2004, Koski and Kretschmer, 2005). The main purpose of these papers is to 
identify a set of variables that will help explain diffusion speed and shape in a particular 
country or set of countries and thus, implicitly, uncover levers that policymakers or firms can 
use in order to ensure the success of a new technology. This approach is well-suited to non-
durable goods where the purchase decision takes place at a single point in time.  
However, in the case of durable goods for which consumption is divided into an initial 
(hardware) purchase and follow-up (service) purchases, simply looking at the number of 
adopters of a new technology may be an inadequate measure of technological success. This is 
because users make consumption decisions over several periods, and the initial adoption 
decision is only part of the cumulative expenditure on a durable technology. Therefore, a 
small number of intensive users may generate higher expected profits or welfare than a large 
number of nominal users. A better (or at the very least complementary) measure of 
technological success may therefore be the overall (or average) usage at a given point in time. 
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Further, since many (if not all) diffusion theories generate s-shaped diffusion curves (often 
with conflicting assumptions) studying usage intensity may enable us to discriminate between 
different diffusion models since their implications on usage intensity over time may be 
different.  
We answer two specific questions in our paper:  
(i) Can we use information about usage intensity over time to draw conclusions about 
the underlying drivers of technology diffusion?  
(ii) What is the effect of the existence and market penetration of previous generations 
and other networks in the same generation on a particular network’s usage 
intensity?  
The first question is aimed at uncovering a number of effects potentially at play along a 
technology’s diffusion path; the heterogeneity, epidemic, and network effects (Geroski, 
2000), which have different implications for the usage intensity of a durable good over time 
(Cabral, 2006). The second question recognizes that new technologies have to be studied in 
the context of the technology they may be replacing and/or competing with. Therefore, we are 
interested if technologies delivering similar services are necessarily substitutes or if there is a 
degree of complementarity through network effects. We study this question both across and 
within generations.  
Our first major result is that consumer heterogeneity plays a much more important role than 
network effects in determining the usage intensity for an individual operator. Second, we find 
that network effects do not seem to operate across different operator networks. Third, we find 
that fixed-line telephony acts as a complement in the usage intensity of cellular telephony, as 
evidenced by cross-price effects. Finally, we find evidence of fixed-mobile platform 
substitution, as lower fixed-line market penetration implies more cellphone usage. These 
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findings are both novel and illuminating for those eager to find more complete measures of 
technological success.1
To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first to consider usage intensity as a measure of 
success for an emerging technology.2 By contrasting our results on usage dynamics with 
results on diffusion speed, we can see if our measures of technological success are correlated 
with those of the conventional diffusion literature. Our paper is also (to our knowledge) the 
first to use aggregate usage data to draw conclusions on the preference distribution of users. 
Our study, especially the analysis of complementarity and substitutability across different 
technological generations, offers new insights on usage dynamics for new technologies in the 
presence of an installed base of imperfectly compatible technologies (Grajek, 2003). Further, 
by taking an explicitly dynamic approach in our analysis, we allow some effects to vary over 
time to see if fixed lines will eventually be replaced by cellular lines after helping to solve the 
start-up problem. 
The paper is structured as follows: We describe the global cellular telecommunications 
industry in Section II and discuss potential determinants of usage intensity in Section III. We 
then describe our data and give descriptive statistics in Section IV. Our empirical results are 
presented in Section V and a discussion follows in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
II The global cellular telecommunications industry 
 
The general features and recent history of the cellular telecommunications industry are 
discussed in detail in Grajek (2003), Koski and Kretschmer (2005) and Gruber and Verboven 
                                                 
1 Comin et al. (2006) develop a framework of technological diffusion in which extensive (adoption) and 
intensive (usage intensity) dimensions of technology diffusion are separated. Their results suggest that the 
existing preconception of s-shaped diffusion holds only if we look at the extensive margin, i.e. first adoption, 
while looking at the intensive margin, i.e. usage intensity, may generate quite different dynamics. 
2 Exceptions include Ward and Woroch, 2004, and Cabral, 2006. 
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(2001). Therefore, we provide only a brief history of the technological improvements and 
corresponding generation changes in cellular telephony over time. 
In most countries, cellular phones were first available to end consumers in the 1980s. The 
technology initially used was based on analogue signal transmission, which was relatively 
inefficient and unreliable. In some countries, first-generation (1G) cellular networks reached 
their capacity relatively quickly, leading to lower service quality and congestion for initiating 
calls in particular. As soon as digital technology (second generation, 2G) had matured enough 
to present a credible alternative to analogue cellular, it was introduced gradually across the 
world (Dekimpe et al, 2000). Several different technological standards were in existence in 
different countries – for example, GSM in Europe, PDCS in Japan – and some countries – 
most notably the US – even introduced several standards in one country. Technological 
competition between standards within countries has been suggested to have slowed down 
overall diffusion (Koski and Kretschmer, 2005), but may have had the long-term effect of 
fostering technological progress for future generations (Cabral and Kretschmer, 2007). In 
addition to 2G’s improved reliability and network capacity, 2G phones also had SMS 
functionality, which enabled users to send short text messages to each other and was a huge 
success among younger users, especially in Asia and Europe.3 Following the success of 2G, a 
third generation with more advanced data transmission facilities was developed and is 
currently being rolled out.  
For our sample period 1998-2004, 2G cellular was dominant. Second generation telephony 
itself displayed significant technological progress, with handsets becoming smaller and 
containing an increasing number of additional functions (Koski and Kretschmer, 2007). In 
addition to ongoing technological innovations on the product side, pricing and services 
                                                 
3 In the US, text messaging had not caught on and the average user was sending 203 text messages a year 
compared to 651 in China in 2004, the end of our study period. 
(http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/8/11/135257.shtml).  
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became increasingly sophisticated. First-generation cellular phones were mainly targeted at 
business consumers for several reasons: First, most handsets were rather heavy and thus used 
predominantly in cars,4 which, combined with very high tariffs, appealed mainly to business 
users. With the introduction of digital cellular telephony, however, operators focused on 
capturing the mass market in order to make the technology succeed commercially.  
Penetration pricing: Early attempts by second-generation cellphone operators were targeted at 
gaining a critical mass of consumers. Since later adopters would be basing their adoption 
decisions on those of early adopters, operators were willing to take a loss, or at least price 
aggressively to grow their installed base. With lock-in contracts over one, sometimes two 
years, this strategy was profitable (Farrell and Klemperer, forthcoming).  
Handset subsidies: Most cellular handsets were, and still are, heavily subsidized. This was a 
strategy to get consumers to adopt in the first place, as handsets were typically the most 
expensive part of getting a cellphone connected.5 Quite frequently then, basic handsets are 
given away “for free”6 if the consumer signed up for a long-term contract. This is a particular 
form of product cross-subsidization to overcome the installed-base problem (Barros, 2006).  
Prepaid contracts (Pay-as-you-go): Possibly the most successful strategy of moving cellular 
telephony into the mass market was the introduction of pay-as-you-go contracts. These 
contracts involve no monthly fee, but a higher per-minute cost. Such contracts are especially 
attractive for low-frequency users for whom a monthly fee would be too high to warrant the 
few calls they make or who do not have access to a bank account to set up a monthly debit. 
                                                 
4 One of the largest cellphone stores in the UK, founded in 1989, is still called “Carphone Warehouse”. 
5 Initially, operators charged a connection fee similar to the fixed-line market, but competition among operators 
forces and an unwillingness of consumers to pay for the privilege of going to a shop and having a shop assistant 
“activate” the connection by clicking a button put paid to this practice. 
6 Most commonly, operators would charge £/$/€ 1 for a handset that typically cost about $100 to produce. There 
are even instances however of “paying” consumers to buy a handset: In France, a Siemens S35 was sold in 
connection with a contract for FFR190 and contained a voucher for a FFR200 reimbursement if sent to the 
mobile operator. 
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The introduction of pay-as-you-go tariffs coincided with a rapid increase in diffusion speed, 
and most of the growth in later stages of diffusion came from prepaid users.7  
Tariff proliferation: Finally, with an increase in competition and increasingly fine market 
segmentation, the number of tariffs has proliferated enormously. This has two effects: First, it 
could serve as a collusive device by confusing consumers (Hörnig, 2005), and second, it 
could enable consumers to make more fine-grained decisions based on their expected calling 
patterns (Miravete and Röller, 2004, Naranayan et al., 2005). The fact that consumers seem to 
switch quite readily between contracts to optimize their behavior (Miravete and Röller, 2004) 
suggests that consumers will have some degree of uncertainty about their future calling 
patterns, but eventually settle on the contract that suits their consumption behavior best.  
III Determinants of cellular usage intensity 
In this section, we identify and discuss potential determinants of cellular usage intensity. 
Specifically, we examine the expected effect of consumer preferences, network effects, and 
substitute technologies on new technology usage.  
Consumer preferences 
The distribution of preferences for current users of a technology will affect the usage intensity 
of a particular technology at any given time. Interestingly, the two most frequently used 
theories of technology diffusion have different implications for usage intensity over the 
diffusion path (Cabral, 2006). The epidemic model assumes that all users have identical 
preferences for a new technology, and the s-shaped path is generated by the different times at 
which adopters learn about the technology (Geroski, 2000).8 Conversely, the heterogeneity 
model postulates that adopters adopt according to their preferences, with the highest-
                                                 
7 This process is currently in reverse as operators try to get pay-as-you-go users to switch to monthly fee 
contracts.  
8 This is the most basic version of the epidemic model, which assumes no external source of information and 
completely identical adopters. The resulting diffusion curve has its maximum diffusion speed at an adoption rate 
of 50%, although more sophisticated models can generate asymmetric diffusion patterns as well. 
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preference adopter moving first, the second-highest moving second and so on. This is called 
the “rank effect” (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993). The rank effect implies a decrease in 
usage intensity over the diffusion curve if, as seems reasonable, the preference to adopt early 
is correlated to using the technology intensively. We do not have a direct measure of 
consumer preferences that would let us measure the rank effect directly, but assuming that 
consumers are heterogeneous, later adopters will have lower preferences than earlier ones, 
which implies that average usage intensity will decrease as more low-preference adopters join 
the network. We also control for a share of consumer heterogeneity in the choice of contract 
(prepaid vs. postpaid), with prepaid consumers typically having lower usage intensity than 
postpaid ones. 
Network and learning effects 
Network effects generally make usage of a technology more attractive since there are more 
potential communication partners (in the case of direct network effects) or a wider variety (or 
cheaper supply) of complementary products. In the case of cellular telephony, direct network 
effects may operate across multiple operators and technologies (since users of a particular 
network can call users from other networks and even fixed line numbers), while indirect 
network effects may operate predominantly on the operator level (via provision of operator-
specific content, ringtones, services etc.). In general, more users of a technology will not only 
make initial adoption more attractive (which has been widely documented in the literature), 
but also usage intensity of existing users. The degree of compatibility, or the extent to which 
users view two competing networks as substitutes, will determine the relative magnitudes of 
the effect of additional subscribers to one’s own network and to a competing network. 
 Further, users of cellular phones may develop a habit of calling each other while in transit, 
e.g. on the bus or train. This used to be uncommon in the early stages of diffusion, but has 
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now become quite common as it is often seen as a productive way of spending otherwise idle 
time.  
Substitute technologies 
In network industries, substitutes in the product market may have a degree of 
complementarity via the network effect, especially considering the usage intensity of existing 
users. To see this, consider a product with network effects whose usefulness increases with 
the number of potential communication partners. Communication partners can either be users 
of the same network, of a competing network, or of the previous generation’s network. This 
would imply that the more users overall, the more utility a user will derive from a specific 
network, which means that existing users of the technology will have a higher incentive to use 
the technology intensively because there are more potential communication links to be 
formed. This would not hold, however, if the competing versions were incompatible. In the 
context of cellular telephony, complete incompatibility is unlikely, although Grajek (2003) 
finds that compatibility among networks is low, i.e. users do not view competing networks as 
close substitutes, mostly because there are different on-net and off-net prices.9 We therefore 
need to distinguish between substitute technologies within the same generation and previous 
generations.  
Intra-generational effects 
The literature studying competition and its effects on product diffusion demonstrates that 
overall diffusion speed typically increases with competition (Koski and Kretschmer, 2005, 
Gruber and Verboven, 2001). This is normally attributed to price and non-price competition 
as well as increased technology-wide network effects. The reason is that in markets with 
switching costs an early build-up of consumers locks in larger numbers of consumers for the 
future.  
                                                 
9 “On-net” prices refer to calls made to members of the same network, “off-net” prices refer to calls to other 
cellular networks. 
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The effect of competition on usage intensity is not obvious, however. First, since strategies of 
winning consumers often take the form of subsidized handsets, the marginal costs of making 
additional calls may well be the same, suggesting no effect on the usage intensity of 
individual consumers arising from increased competition. Second, since users will adopt a 
technology if the overall expected utility exceeds the costs of purchasing, lowering prices will 
attract adopters with lower preferences and therefore lower expected usage intensity. Intense 
competition may therefore have the effect of the rapid adoption of a technology (i.e., a steep 
s-shaped diffusion curve), but decreasing usage intensity because low-preference users end up 
adopting more quickly than they would otherwise.10
Previous generation substitutes 
Existing work on the effect of the installed base of an existing technology suggests that a 
larger installed base typically hinders transition to a new technology. If users of the 
incumbent generation incur some cost of switching to the new generation, a large installed 
base may prevent them from switching, and given network effects, the new technology may 
not be adopted at all unless the degree of technological improvement in large enough (Farrell 
and Saloner, 1985, Shy, 1996). In markets with backward compatibility, however, this result 
may be overturned. If early users of the new generation can communicate with “old” users, 
the start-up problem for the new generation may be alleviated. Koski and Kretschmer (2005) 
show that in countries with a comparably large number of 1G mobile users, 2G cellular 
telephony diffused more quickly, which mirrors the results of Liikanen et al. (2004). On the 
other hand, Barros and Cadima (2002), Sung et al. (2000), and Liikanen et al. (2004) show 
that mobile and fixed-line telephony appear to be substitutes. Ward and Woroch (2004) find 
similar results, but look at usage rather than adoption.  
                                                 
10 This only holds, of course, if later adopters are indeed low-intensity users. Our empirical results show that this 
is indeed the case, as can be seen in section V. 
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Overall then, we believe that it is possible that a complementary effect may only be relevant 
while the start-up problem still exists, i.e. in the early stages of the new generation, whereas in 
later stages, we may see users replacing their fixed-line connections with mobile connections 
or new generations of buyers eschewing the old technology completely. Therefore, the effect 
of fixed-line prices and availability on mobile adoption and usage may vary over the diffusion 
curve.  
IV Data 
We draw our data predominantly from two sources: The Informa Telecoms & Media World 
Cellular GSM Datapack (Informa T&M) and Merrill Lynch’s Global Wireless Matrix. The 
Informa T&M data has been used in previous studies (e.g. Koski and Kretschmer, 2005) and 
covers the number of subscribers for individual mobile operators, average prices and 
technological standards in considerable detail. Informa T & M is a provider of market and 
business intelligence to commercial entities in the mobile and media industries. Buyers of this 
data base commercial and marketing decisions on the data, thus ensuring a high level of 
accuracy. Merrill Lynch, a US-based investment bank, publishes a quarterly report on the 
development of the global cellular telephony market as a service to their clients and industry 
observers. Merrill Lynch reports, among other data, the total number of called minutes per 
operator, which can be used to construct the average usage per consumer.  
Obtaining data often involves a tradeoff between the level of detail (which is often higher in 
commercial datasets) and the reliability of the data (which is generally regarded higher for 
data collected by non-commercial organizations). To minimize these problems, we 
triangulated the data with available public data sources (OECD’s Communications Outlook, 
ITU’s Telecommunications Indicators) and found that the variables common to both private 
and public data were comparable. We are therefore quite confident that our data is accurate.  
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To complement our main data sources, we use IMF’s International Financial Statistics (for 
GDP) and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (for population, telephone mainlines, 
and average cost of a local call). The disadvantage of the WDI database is that it only 
provides yearly time series. To arrive at the quarterly series we therefore linearly interpolated 
the variables. 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of our variables. The data coverage depends on a particular 
variable, but overall our sample covers more than 100 network operators in more than 40 
countries. Looking at time trends of our variables of interest in Table 2, we can see that the 
increased penetration of cellphones in our sample coincides with a significant increase in the 
share of prepaid consumers. We also find a clear downward trend in cellular service prices in 
our sample and an upward trend in average usage. Contrary to cellular telephony, subscription 
of fixed lines decreases slightly over our study period, while fixed-line prices remain 
constant. Stage is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if cellular diffusion in a country is 
advanced and zero otherwise.11 As Table 2 reports, in the beginning year of our sample there 
were no advanced countries in terms of cellular telephony diffusion, whereas in the last year 
almost all countries reached an advanced stage. 
Our data reflects some of the interesting dynamics in the cellular phone industry in the late 
1990 and early 2000s. Diffusion was rapid – penetration rates increased almost four-fold over 
six years – and prepaid usage went from being an option chosen by one subscriber in four to 
the option preferred by half of all users. Of course, looking at sample averages is likely to 
hide a number of idiosyncrasies, in particular some of the effects we are interested in. For 
illustrative purposes, we therefore consider the diffusion and usage patterns of two individual 
countries.  
                                                 
11 The variable Stage will be defined later on, when we describe country-wise cellphone diffusion. 
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Two examples – Chile and Malaysia 
Our goal is to link usage patterns to different stages of the diffusion curve. The following 
figures plot diffusion and average usage in Chile and Malaysia, respectively.  
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Figure 1: Chile, Diffusion and average usage, 9/98 – 9/04 
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Figure 2: Malaysia, Diffusion and average usage, 9/98 – 9/04 
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From Figure 1 we can see that Chile displays a pattern of first increasing, then decreasing 
average usage. Figure 2 shows that average usage in Malaysia is decreasing fairly steadily 
over time. OLS regressions confirm that a linear time trend yields a poor fit for Chile (Slope: -
.201, R2 = .008), while it generates a better fit for Malaysia (Slope: -1.048, R2 = .374). 
Including a nonlinear term improves results for Chile to an R2 of .253, while results remain 
similar for Malaysia (R2 = .423).  
The above descriptive statistics suggest that usage patterns can vary significantly across 
countries, despite the fact that diffusion is s-shaped in both countries. 12 Clearly, these 
statistics should be interpreted with caution since we do not control for important country- 
and firm-level variables. For example, Malaysia had an approximately 50% higher 
penetration rate throughout the sample and the Malay economy grew by about 55% in the 
sample period compared to 20% growth in Chile. At any rate, the different usage patterns 
suggest that usage intensity across countries is worth studying in more detail. We will 
therefore first run a fairly standard diffusion regression for each country before looking at 
determinants of average usage by cellular operator in the next section.  
Global diffusion of cellular telephony  
The wide coverage of our sample means that we consider countries that already reached near 
full penetration alongside countries in which cellular telephony had just taken off in 1998. As 
mentioned, average usage may differ significantly by the stage of diffusion a country’s 
cellular network is in. To provide a descriptive summary of the diffusion process, we estimate 
a country-level logistic diffusion equation of the form:13
))(exp(1
*
τβ −−+= t
SUBSSUBSt ,        (1) 
                                                 
12 Note that we are not covering a complete s-shape in our data. The two countries chosen here for illustrative 
purposes have roughly linear growth during our study period, i.e. we are capturing the linear part in the middle 
of the diffusion curve for these countries. 
13 Beck et al. (2005) discuss this diffusion equation and contrast it with the others commonly used in the 
literature. 
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where SUBS* = γPOP. 
SUBSt denotes the number of subscribers at time t, and POP measures the population of a 
country. The potential number of adopters SUBS*, i.e. the saturation level to which SUBSt 
converges, is assumed to be a fraction γ of the total country’s population. The other two 
parameters describing the diffusion process, τ and β, stand for timing and speed of the 
diffusion respectively. That is, τ indicates the inflection point of the logistic curve, while β 
gives the growth rate of SUBSt relative to its distance to the saturation level, i.e. 
*
*1
SUBS
SUBSSUBS
SUBSdt
dSUBS t
t
t −= β . The growth rate reaches its maximum (
2
β ) at the 
inflection point t = τ. Table 3 presents Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) estimates of the 
country-specific regressions, where τ is measured in quarters: the average τ is approximately 
163, which corresponds to the 4th quarter of 2000 – the average country in our sample reaches 
its inflection point in late 2000. There are significant differences across countries, however: In 
Finland, our estimates suggest that diffusion speed reaches its maximum about 18 months 
earlier (τ = 154.6) than the average, while in Russia, the estimated inflection point was in late 
2004 (τ = 178.9). To illustrate the different diffusion stage across countries in our sample, we 
also pick three country groups – leaders, followers, and laggards, based on our estimates of τ 
– and plot actual and fitted penetration levels for the three groups in Figures 3 – 5. 
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Figure 3. Leaders’ mobile penetration diffusion 
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Figure 4. Followers’ mobile penetration diffusion 
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Figure 5. Laggards’ mobile penetration diffusion 
 
Our regression estimates fit the actual diffusion curve reasonably well. We do not report the 
obtained high R2 in Table 3, as they are common in such non-linear models and do not 
necessarily indicate a good specification (Trajtenberg and Yitzhaki, 1989). Instead, we report 
the fixed-line penetration ratios in the last year of our sample. By contrasting it with the 
estimated cellular penetration thresholds (γ), we see that the fixed-line and the estimated 
cellular penetration rations correspond to each other quite well. In particular, the countries 
with very low γ (Argentina, China, and Venezuela) exhibit very low level of fixed-line 
penetration as well. Finally, the average estimated fixed-to-mobile penetration ratio roughly 
equals 2, which has some intuitive appeal as there was typically one fixed line per household, 
whereas with the penetration of cellular telephony two members of a household may own a 
cellular phone. 
Since the logistic diffusion equation is symmetric around the inflection point τ, which cuts the 
diffusion process into halves, it naturally defines the stage of the diffusion. Further, since the 
countries in our sample are at very different stages of diffusion and since some of our 
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potential determinants may have different effects across a technology’s lifecycle, we want to 
account for this by allowing for time-varying effects in our regressions. Therefore, we define 
the variable Stage, which takes value 1 if a country’s cellular diffusion has reached the 
estimated inflection point and zero otherwise, and intersect it with our variables of interest.14 
For two countries (Columbia and India) the nonlinear estimation procedure did not converge, 
as 2G cellphones were just taking off in 2004. We then set the Stage to equal zero for them. 
V Empirical specification and results 
Usage regressions 
We use average usage intensity per subscriber as our dependent variable and identify its 
determinants in our sample. Note that our dataset allows us to run usage regressions on 
operator level. This is useful since operators in the same country may have different 
characteristics, for example the proportion of prepaid users or the installed base of 
subscribers, both of which are expected affect the average usage intensity of this particular 
operator. Also, including average prices by operator lets us uncover own-price and cross-price 
effects on communication demands. 
Our baseline specification of the cellular phone usage reads as follows: 
MoUijt = αij + δ1* CellPijt + δ2* CellPi(-j)t + δ3*FixedPit + δ4*CellSubsijt + δ5*CellSubsi(-j)t + 
+ δ6*FixedSubsit + θ*Xijt + eijt,        (2) 
where subscripts i, j, and t stand for country, cellphone operator, and time, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the average monthly minutes of use per subscriber. We consider both 
own and cross price effects on cellphone usage by including the operator’s (j) own price, the 
average price of other cellphone operators in the country (-j), as well as the price of local 
fixed-line connection, in the regressions. Similarly, we distinguish between the operator’s 
                                                 
14 Experiments with defining “advanced diffusion” at a later (or earlier) stage yield effectively the same results. 
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own network of subscribers, subscribers to other cellphone operators, and fixed-line 
subscribers. To facilitate comparison across countries, all price variables are in US cents and 
the subscribers variables are normalized by the total country’s population.  
The vector Xijt contains a set of control variables: GDP per capita, the share of prepaid-card 
users in the own subscriber base, and the time on air. Finally, the α’s capture the unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries and operators driven by different pricing regimes (Receiving 
Party Pays vs. Calling Party Pays), different tastes for communications services (Italians tend 
to talk more than Swedes), incumbents’ first-mover advantages or operators’ brand 
reputation, and other time-invariant country and operator-specific effects.15
Expected effects 
Based on our discussion in Section III, we now briefly summarize the expected effects on 
usage intensity of the variables we use in our estimations.  
Own subscribers (CellSubsijt). The number of subscribers of one’s own and substitute 
networks are our main variables of interest. With them, we intend to capture the effects of 
consumer heterogeneity and network effects on usage intensity along the diffusion path. Its 
sign depends on the presence (or absence) of different factors and the underlying diffusion 
mechanism. If diffusion is driven by consumer heterogeneity – accompanied by falling price 
or increasing quality over time – we expect a negative coefficient on the network size variable 
since subscribers joining the network later on have a lower preference for the product and 
thus decrease average usage intensity. If, however, strong network effects are present, 
increasing communications opportunities due to growing network size may offset the rank 
effect leading to an increasing usage intensity of a network (Cabral, 2006). Depending on 
                                                 
15 The operator-specific effects would also pick up systematically different consumer groups by operators. If, for 
example, one operator were especially successful in attracting the high-usage bracket of a particular consumer 
group, this would manifest itself in a positive fixed effect. 
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which of the effects dominates – rank/consumer-heterogeneity effect or network effect – the 
own cellular network variable will carry negative or positive sign, respectively.16  
Competing network size (CellSubsi(-j)t). Unlike the rank effect, the network effect will also be 
at play for subscribers to the other cellular operators (-j) within a country if it originates from 
cellular users calling each other across different operator networks. This is because additional 
subscribers to competing cellular networks increase the overall network and thereby 
communication opportunities while leaving the composition of the own subscriber base 
unchanged. On the other hand, the competing network size variable also captures the 
substitution effect between the technologies. Although holding fixed-line and cellular 
connections at the same time – a prerequisite for usage substitution between platforms – is 
much more common than holding cellular connections with different operators, the latter is 
also observed, in particular in mature cellular telecom markets (Wireless Intelligence, 2006, 
Doganoglu and Wright, 2006). We therefore expect the sign on the competing network size to 
be determined be the relative importance of the network and the substitution effects. 
Fixed-line network size (FixedSubsit). To a certain extent, the arguments for competing 
network size should also apply for fixed-line network size. However, we expect the 
substitutability to be less pronounced as users are more likely to simultaneously hold a fixed-
line and a cellular connection than to hold two cellular connections. However, a negative 
effect of fixed-line network size on cellular usage would suggest shifting usage between the 
platforms induced by a subscription decision, i.e. a substitutive relationship. 
Share of prepaid users (Prepayijt). Prepaid consumers will typically face higher marginal 
costs and lower fixed costs, which is consistent with a lower average usage intensity 
                                                 
16 Word-of-mouth (or epidemic) diffusion models do not deliver any prediction concerning the usage intensity of 
a diffusing technology. 
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(Miravete and Röller, 2004). We therefore expect a negative effect of the share of prepaid 
users on usage intensity as prepaid consumers are likely to be low-intensity callers. 
Own prices (CellPijt). Clearly, the price of a product and its substitutes (measured in our study 
as the average revenue per minute) will have an effect on usage intensity. Controlling for 
other factors that might shift demand intertemporally (e.g. network or learning effects, quality 
improvements), we expect own price to have a negative impact on usage intensity.17  
Competitors’ prices (CellPi(-j)t). The standard textbook argument suggests positive cross-price 
elasticity for substitutes. We therefore expect a positive coefficient on the price of competing 
cellphone operators in our regressions, as the cellular services offered by competing operators 
are clearly substitutes.  
Fixed-Line prices (FixedPit).  The relationship between fixed-line and cellular phones is less 
clear-cut. The empirical literature finds evidence of both substitution and complementarity 
between fixed and cellular telephony by looking at subscription rates (see Ahn and Lee, 1999; 
Barros and Cadima, 2000; Sung et al., 2000; Rodini et al., 2003). Regarding usage intensity, a 
higher price of fixed lines may imply users shifting their communication to mobile telephony. 
However, higher fixed-line prices may also imply lower attractiveness of using 
communications networks in general as the two act as complements. The balance between 
these two effects will therefore determine the sign of the coefficient.  
Time on air (Onairijt). This variable measures the time passed since the launch of cellular 
service by an operator, i.e. the “age” of a service. The expected effect of an established 
network and technology is a gradual increase in the usage intensity since users get in the habit 
of calling on the move, and the network may develop over time in terms of quality and brand 
reputation. 
                                                 
17 Endogeneity and other econometric issues are covered in the next section. 
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GDP (GDPjt). Finally, we expect cellphone usage to exhibit a positive income effect, captured 
by a positive coefficient on the level of GDP in a country. 
Econometric issues and estimation results 
Our estimation strategy is as follows: To strip out operator-specific effects αij, we apply fixed-
effects (FE) as well as first-differenced (FD) estimation. In these regressions we do not 
correct for the possible endogeneity of our explanatory variables as described above. 
Comparing the results across these two estimation techniques is, however, a useful exercise, 
as under endogeneity these two estimators generally have different probability limits, which 
provides a simple test of endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). We also address potential 
endogeneity by using an instrumental variables (IV) approach accounting for operator fixed 
effects at the same time. 
Further, to test robustness of our results, we consider a log-linear and a log-log specification 
as alternatives to the linear specification in (2). Besides serving as a robustness check, the log-
log specification is useful as its coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.  
Identification 
To identify own- and cross-price effects, and thereby the possible complementarity or 
substitutability between operators, we need to address the likely endogeneity of our price 
variables, as prices may be set in direct response to a change in usage intensity. Making use of 
the panel nature of the data, we construct instrumental variables based on the geographical 
proximity between countries (see Hausman, 1997). To the extent that there are some common 
cost elements in the cellular service provision across regions (e,g, costs of equipment and 
materials), we can instrument for prices in a given country by average prices in all other 
countries of the region. For instance, prices in the UK can be instrumented for with a cellular 
price index for the rest of Western Europe. To arrive at an operator-specific instrumental 
variable, we further condition it on the technological standards deployed by each operator. 
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For instance, we instrument for price of a Chinese operator deploying the GSM standard with 
prices of GSM operators from other Asian-Pacific countries; the price of a Chinese operator 
deploying CDMA standard with prices of CDMA operators from other Asian-Pacific 
countries; and so on.18
Among our instruments we additionally include fixed-line employment to proxy for telecom 
operators’ efficiencies, as well as lagged values of all instruments. 
As the decision whether to subscribe and how much to call is a joint one, cellular and fixed-
line network variables are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias in our usage equation as well 
– any omitted effects that encourage both more usage intensity and new subscriptions (e.g. 
promotional campaigns) will lead to correlation between our network variables and the error 
term. To the extent that the omitted effects are not persistent, lagged values of the network 
size offer a possible instrument. To avoid equations with lagged dependent variables in the 
first stage of the IV procedure, we include the lagged values of network size as explanatory 
variables rather than instruments. 
Main results 
The first set of results is reported in Table 4. Since preliminary regressions exhibited high 
autocorrelation in the error term, we used cluster-robust standard errors in our reported 
results. The results in columns (1) – (3) come from fixed-effects (FE), first-differenced (FD), 
and instrumental variable (IV FE) estimation respectively. 
A useful indicator for the likely importance of endogeneity problems is the extent to which 
results change across different econometric specifications. Our results are not drastically 
different between the FE and FD specifications, however, the cluster-robust Hausman test 
comparing the two rejects the null at the 1% significance. We then ran IV regressions with the 
                                                 
18 The classification of countries into regions we apply follows the Informa T&M classification and includes: 
USA/Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia/Pacific, Africa, and Americas. 
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set of instruments described in the previous section. The instruments performed very well: the 
partial R2 of the instruments ranged from 0.08 to 0.27 in the first-stage regressions and the 
instruments were jointly significant at the 1% level in all of the regressions. Further, Hansen’s 
J statistic, which is a valid overidentification test when observations are correlated within 
clusters (Hayashi, 2000, Baum et al., 2003), did not reject the null. The instruments performed 
equally well in other functional form specifications, which we cover in the section on 
robustness checks. We found that the IV results are close to the OLS results, except that the 
price effects become larger. The Hausman test, however, —again, we use its cluster-robust 
version—rejects the null of exogeneity at the 5% level.  
Our control variables – the share of prepaid users, time on air, and GDP – have the expected 
signs (negative, positive, and positive, respectively) and are mostly significant. Reassuringly, 
we find a significant negative own-price effect on cellphone usage in all three regressions, 
whereas the cross-price effect is positive but only marginally significant. The magnitudes and 
significance of these price effects suggests relatively low degree of substitution, consistent 
with Grajek (2003). From the IV specification we read that a decrease in own price by 1 US 
cent leads to an increase in the average monthly usage of a customer by 4 minutes. For fixed-
line prices, we find some evidence of usage complementarity – the coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 10% level in the IV regression. 
Turning to the subscriber network variables, we find strong evidence of the consumer 
heterogeneity effect dominating the network effect. The coefficient on own market 
penetration is significantly negative in all specifications, which implies that additional 
subscribers to one’s own cellular network significantly decreases average cellphone usage. 
The magnitude of this effect is not marginal: From the IV specification we can see that the 
average usage intensity decreases by roughly 2 minutes per month with an increase of the 
penetration by 1 percentage point. In other words, to offset the effect of an additional 
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percentage point of low-intensity users to an existing network, an operator needs to drop the 
prices per minute by .5 US cent (the average price per minute drops from over 35 cent to 
below 20 cent in our sample period).  
The results in Table 4 also suggest that network effects do not operate across operator 
networks. The coefficient on market penetration of cellular competitors is insignificant in all 
three specifications. The apparent absence of network effects in cellphone usage is somewhat 
surprising given previous results that find network effects to significantly contribute to the 
speed of cellular diffusion process (Grajek, 2003; Koski and Kretschmer, 2005; Liikanen et 
al., 2004). However, a number of remarks are in order here: First, our results do not imply that 
there are no network effects; they merely suggest that they do not outweigh the consumer 
heterogeneity effect, and that no significant network effects seem to operate across different 
cellular networks. Further, we consider a different dependent variable – usage intensity – than 
existing studies. Thus, while network effects may be weak regarding usage intensity, they 
may be strong for first subscriptions. Finally, network effects may be limited to a very small 
network of “relevant” users (Birke and Swann, 2006), which would lead to an apparently 
small network effect if network size were measured at the level of the economy.  
Finally, the coefficient on fixed-line market penetration is negative and highly significant. It 
is also larger in magnitude than the coefficient on cellular penetration. This indicates a degree 
of fixed-mobile platform substitution. It is interesting to contrast this finding with our 
previous result on fixed-mobile usage complementarity as evidenced by the negative impact 
of fixed-line prices on cellphone usage. It appears that the two communication platforms are 
complements to the extent that keeping both fixed-line and cellular connection at the same 
time is viable from a household perspective. Once households decide to cut the fixed-line, 
however, they move the entire telephone usage to cellular. This coexistence of the 
complementary and the substitution elements is in line with the results in Sung et al. (2000). 
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They report that the number of Korean mobile subscribers is positively (negatively) correlated 
with the number of fixed-line disconnects (new connections), which suggests substitution. At 
the same time, they find the stock of fixed lines being positively correlated with the number 
of mobile subscribers, providing evidence of complementarity. 
Time-varying effects 
To further investigate the relationship between old and new telecommunications technologies 
we also allow for the effects of prices and installed bases to vary over time. The motivation 
behind time-varying coefficients is that the relationship between the old and the new 
telecommunications technologies or between competitors might change depending on the 
diffusion stage of the new technology. For example, when the market penetration of 
cellphones is low, most cellular communication may go to (and from) fixed lines as there are 
limited opportunities for cellular-cellular interaction. On the other hand, when cellular 
penetration reaches full market size, all communications needs can in principle be satisfied on 
the cellular network alone and fixed lines become obsolete. Therefore, the relationship 
between the two technologies may change from complements initially (as fixed lines help 
cellular overcome the installed base problem) to substitutes (as cellular phones replace fixed 
lines) in later stages of the diffusion process. 
To capture this, we interact fixed-line prices and our other variables of interest with a 
diffusion stage indicator. The indicator is constructed from the estimates of the country-wise 
diffusion regressions (Table 3) and equals 1 in periods after a country reaches the inflection 
point of cellular diffusion (τ) and zero otherwise. We report our results in Table 5. 
The results are consistent with our earlier results, which gives us additional confidence in the 
quality of our instruments. We can interpret the sum of the early-stage (with Stage = 0) and 
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the late-stage (with Stage = 1) coefficients as the net effect in the later stages of diffusion, 
while for the early diffusion stage only the first coefficient matters.  
We find that own-price sensitivity increases in later stages of diffusion, which is consistent 
with the addition of more low-intensity, high-elasticity users (over and above prepaid 
consumers, which we control for). This result is not very strong, however, as the change in 
own-price effect is significant only in the FE specification. We also find some evidence of 
multihoming becoming significant in the later stages of diffusion, as can be seen from the 
negative coefficient on CellSubsi(-j)t, although it is only significant in our IV specification. The 
coefficient indicates that the higher the penetration of competing networks, the lower the 
usage intensity of one’s own network – users use their other cellphone to make calls, or divide 
calls between them (Doganoglu and Wright, 2006).  
Finally, we find that the penetration of fixed lines is negative in the early stages of diffusion, 
but this effect wears off as diffusion progresses (since the interacted variable is positive and 
significant). Possibly this is because households cutting their fixed line relatively late are the 
ones with low overall usage as well. Similarly, we find evidence of a “tapering off” of the 
(negative) own installed base effect, albeit only weakly. We did not find, however, any 
significant change in the cross-price effects in the late diffusion stage. That is, our hypothesis 
that fixed-mobile complementarity might be challenged in the later diffusion stage found no 
support. 
Further robustness checks 
To further test the robustness of our findings we reestimate the model imposing two 
alternative functional forms: log-linear and log-log. The results, which are reported in Tables 
A1 and A2, are consistent with the previous ones. The only change is that the effect of 
competing network size sometimes becomes significantly negative also in the early diffusion 
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stage. This effect only magnifies in the later stage, which is still consistent with the 
multihoming story. The interpretation of our main results stays unchanged. 
VI Discussion of the results 
The relationship between mobile usage and the network size is determined by two 
countervailing forces: Network effects and consumer heterogeneity effects. Network effects 
arise as the growing installed base of subscribers allows them to satisfy more communications 
needs; hence the average number of calls increases with network size. Consumer 
heterogeneity effects imply that usage of telecommunications services decreases with the 
installed base of subscribers, as less eager (or poorer) users subscribe to the service over time 
and “dilute” usage intensity as the installed base grows.  
One of the problems in estimating the relative strength of these effects is that adding 
subscribers has the dual effect of enlarging an operator’s network and adding lower-
preference users to the network. Our regressions suggest that in all specifications the 
heterogeneity effect strongly dominates the network effect since the coefficient on own 
network penetration is consistently negative and significant. A potential strategy to isolate the 
network from the composition effect was to consider the subscribers of competing networks 
since the composition of an operator’s own network does not change while overall network 
size grows. In our regressions, however, we find that competing network size does not have a 
significant positive effect on own usage intensity. While this does not imply that there are no 
network effects, we can at least conclude that they do not outweigh the heterogeneity effect, 
and that no significant network effects seem to operate across different cellular networks. 
That is, if network effects exist, they do not appear to originate from opportunities to call 
cellular users from other networks. One possible interpretation could be that there are 
significant network effects from sending and receiving text messages to other cellular users, 
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but not from calling them. This would allow us to reconcile the fact that network effects are 
regularly found in adoption studies (e.g. Koski and Kretschmer, 2005, Gruber and Verboven, 
2001) with the apparent absence of network effects in our usage intensity regressions. That is, 
adopting a cellphone becomes more attractive if there are many others to exchange text 
messages with, but this does not imply that users will call each other more.  
As already mentioned, there is small but growing literature on substitutability of fixed-line 
and cellular telephony. Our regression results suggest that one important point is whether we 
consider telephone usage alone (given subscription decision) or usage and subscription as a 
joint decision. Given the subscription decision (that is, controlling for the installed base of 
subscribers) we find some evidence of fixed-mobile complementarity. On the other hand, the 
two telecommunications platforms seem to be substitutes in terms of subscriptions, as the size 
of fixed-line network is negatively correlated with cellphone usage. This suggests that an 
incumbent technology like fixed-line telephony may foster diffusion at the start of cellular 
diffusion, but is likely to be replaced eventually as the new technology matures. 
Finally, we also find no support for increasing usage intensity over time after other 
determinants are controlled for, as can be seen from the coefficient on time on air. Thus, we 
do not find evidence of learning effects and habit formation, which we do not pick up in our 
network size variables. 
 
VII Conclusions and further research 
We study the usage patterns of 2G cellular telephony over time using data from 41 countries 
over the 1998-2004 time period. Our reduced-form regressions have uncovered a number of 
interesting findings. First, it seems that consumer heterogeneity is considerable and network 
effects are moderate in comparison. Second, we find some evidence of fixed-mobile usage 
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complementarity in the early stages of diffusion. At the same time we observe substitution of 
fixed-line with cellular minutes driven by the changes in fixed-line subscriber base. This 
effect seems to wear off later as cellular telephony becomes more established.  
These results are consistent across most specifications and benefit from the use of 
instruments, suggesting that endogeneity needs to be accounted for.  
In what follows, we outline a number of potential avenues for future research:  
Functional form of network effects and heterogeneity: Our current reduced-form approach 
does not permit a separate and precise interpretation of the shape of the preference 
distribution or the functional form of network effects individually, but rather the net effect of 
both. One way to further separate out composition and network effects would be to assume a 
sufficiently general distribution of preferences (taken, e.g., from Rogers, 2003), a functional 
form for network effects (e.g., Swann, 2002), and a degree of compatibility between the 
networks of different operators (e.g. Grajek, 2003). This would facilitate a quantitative 
interpretation of the coefficients we obtain, although obviously at the cost of having to make 
some, possibly quite restrictive assumptions about the functional form of consumer utility and 
the resulting usage behavior as well as their degree of foresight. However, such an approach 
may be complementary to ours, as the previously assumed strength of network effects is 
called somewhat in question by the results reported in this paper. 
Role of prepaid consumers: We find unequivocally that the proportion of prepaid consumers 
has a negative effect on average usage intensity, as expected. We do not, however, study in 
detail the origins and effects of the number of prepaid consumers in competition between 
operators. For example, persistent first-mover advantages may imply that later operators can 
only catch up by offering prepaid services, which may in turn affect the first mover’s existing 
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users’ incentives to call. In other words, the use of prepaid users as a competitive tool and 
their contribution to network effects seems an interesting line of research to follow up.  
Gaining insight on the shape of consumer preferences has significant implications for firm 
and policymaker behavior. Strong consumer heterogeneity suggests that early adopters are 
more profitable than later ones – assuming that their decision to adopt earlier also represents a 
higher willingness to make calls.19 This would then make introductory pricing a double-edged 
sword: On the one hand, securing these early customers is likely to have long-term benefits, 
while on the other hand these early consumers are likely to represent a large proportion of a 
firm’s profits.20 Similarly, diffusion policies will be assessed on their expected impact on 
consumer surplus and firm profits, which depends on the distribution of consumer preferences 
and the intensity of network effects. Our results indicate that network effects are not 
overwhelming in determining usage, in which case penetration pricing by operators 
significantly benefits early consumers (who get lower prices) rather than later ones (who do 
not benefit much from a larger network).  
This study is the first to our knowledge that empirically tries to disentangle the consumer-
heterogeneity and the network effect on technological diffusion. Our study is also the first to 
allow for time-varying effects of an incumbent technology, which has important implications 
for policymaker and firms in their incentives to phase out existing technologies. We believe 
that while there have been a number of recent studies on the diffusion of mobile telephony 
(including our own), recovering some information on the underlying parameters and the 
subsequent causes of diffusion is a crucial next step in the study of new technologies and their 
success and impact on society.  
                                                 
19 This would not be the case if early adopters had a high preference for incoming calls (e.g. for emergency 
purposes), but not outgoing ones. However, we believe such a pattern to be the exception rather than the rule.  
20 There is an extensive literature in marketing science that concerns itself with the optimal pricing path of new 
products based on assumptions about the s-shaped diffusion curve, but not on the origins of the s-curve (see, e.g., 
Krishnan et al., 1999).  
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Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Obs. Operators Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MoU Average monthly minutes of use 2146 114 174.52 115.54 51 960 
CellP Average revenue per minute (US cents) 2052 109 22.03 10.69 3.26 114.00 
FixedP Price of a local fixed-line connection (US cents) 2839 157 8.33 5.21 0 19 
CellSubs(j) Own subscribers as population's share (%) 3110 150 12.70 12.11 0.002 54.58 
CellSubs(-j) Subscribers to competing operators as population's share (%) 3110 150 31.50 22.47 0.04 99.49 
FixedSubs Fixed-line subscribers as population's share (%) 3199 157 40.96 20.91 2.20 75.76 
Prepay Share of prepay users among own subscribers (%) 3110 150 43.54 29.95 0 100 
OnAir Time since the launch of service (quarters) 3444 150 15.94 13.34 0 50 
GDP GDP per capita (000's US dollars) 3561 157 17.79 13.01 0.36 51.98 
Stage 
Diffusion stage indicator (1 after a 
country reached the inflection point of 
the cellular telephony diffusion; 0 
otherwise) 
3605 157 0.66 0.47 0 1 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by year (variable definitions as in Table 1)  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
MoU 162.42 157.67 170.82 176.68 177.15 185.26 198.44 
CellP 35.70 31.88 23.60 19.36 18.30 19.64 19.31 
FixedP 8.79 9.63 8.27 7.86 7.75 8.56 9.61 
CellSubs(j) 6.64 9.62 12.57 15.02 17.06 18.99 20.38 
CellSubs(-j) 12.55 17.00 24.40 32.55 37.55 42.89 45.94 
FixedSubs 49.28 48.39 47.37 47.39 46.99 45.22 45.68 
Prepay 24.16 30.11 37.76 43.81 47.65 50.71 49.63 
OnAir 14.32 15.67 16.80 19.14 22.93 26.43 29.43 
GDP 20.45 21.31 20.09 18.84 19.76 22.02 25.39 
Stage 0.00 0.17 0.63 0.82 0.88 0.96 0.99 
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Table 3. Country-wise logistic diffusion coefficients 
country γ β τ fixed lines per capita 
mobile-to-
fixed ratio 
Argentina 0.19 0.28 157.1 0.22 0.84 
Australia 0.93 0.12 162.3 0.54 1.72 
Austria 0.89 0.29 157.7 0.49 1.80 
Belgium 0.82 0.29 160.4 0.52 1.59 
Brazil 0.53 0.11 175.5 0.22 2.39 
Canada 0.50 0.11 162.1 0.68 0.73 
Chile 0.56 0.18 166.2 0.23 2.43 
China 0.29 0.18 169.7 0.21 1.39 
Colombia*    0.18  
Czech Republic 1.03 0.25 164.5 0.38 2.72 
Denmark 1.11 0.14 161.2 0.72 1.53 
Egypt 0.10 0.20 168.1 0.13 0.82 
Finland 1.13 0.08 154.6 0.56 2.03 
France 0.70 0.24 159.5 0.58 1.20 
Germany 0.77 0.31 160.2 0.66 1.16 
Greece 1.06 0.18 163.0 0.54 1.97 
Hungary 1.01 0.17 167.3 0.38 2.66 
India*    0.05  
Ireland 0.83 0.29 160.2 0.50 1.65 
Israel 1.00 0.18 160.4 0.47 2.12 
Italy 1.03 0.18 158.8 0.48 2.13 
Japan 0.78 0.10 156.9 0.59 1.33 
Korea 0.83 0.12 160.0 0.54 1.54 
Malaysia 0.64 0.14 169.4 0.20 3.15 
Mexico 0.32 0.23 164.0 0.16 2.02 
Netherlands 0.82 0.30 158.7 0.62 1.32 
New Zealand 0.71 0.23 160.0 0.49 1.45 
Norway 1.00 0.09 157.9 0.73 1.36 
Poland 0.70 0.15 170.5 0.32 2.19 
Portugal 1.09 0.19 160.6 0.43 2.52 
Russia 0.87 0.23 178.9 0.24 3.60 
Singapore 0.89 0.23 160.0 0.48 1.83 
South Africa 0.58 0.13 172.1 0.13 4.54 
Spain 0.93 0.22 161.0 0.51 1.83 
Sweden 1.25 0.09 160.7 0.76 1.65 
Switzerland 0.88 0.24 159.2 0.74 1.18 
Thailand 0.46 0.26 169.9 0.11 4.39 
Turkey 0.42 0.23 164.7 0.29 1.47 
United Kingdom 0.92 0.26 159.9 0.59 1.56 
United States 0.67 0.10 161.3 0.67 1.00 
Venezuela 0.27 0.22 159.7 0.12 2.20 
average 0.76 0.19 162.9 0.43 1.92 
* Missing coefficient indicate that the NLS estimation procedure did not converge. 
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Table 4. Cellphone usage estimation results 
Dependent variable: Avg. Minutes of Use  MoU (1) (2) (3) 
Price Effects:     
Own Price CellP(j) -2.714*** -1.729*** -3.988*** 
  (0.549) (0.380) (1.285) 
Avg. Price of Mobile Competitors CellP(-j) 0.510 0.120 0.852 
  (0.350) (0.142) (1.042) 
Price of Local Fixed-Line Connection FixedP -2.575 0.679 -13.388* 
  (1.735) (0.618) (8.127) 
Installed Base Effects:     
Own Penetration CellSubs(j) -1.251* -1.534** -1.886* 
  (0.741) (0.621) (1.076) 
Penetration of Mobile Competitors CellSubs(-j) 0.455 -0.207 -0.449 
  (0.565) (0.273) (0.543) 
Penetration of Fixed Line FixedSubs -2.667** -1.385 -4.219*** 
  (1.198) (0.951) (1.531) 
Controls:     
Share of Own Prepay Users Prepay -1.092*** -0.149 -1.103*** 
  (0.223) (0.111) (0.357) 
GDP GDP 3.743*** 1.552*** 6.263 
  (1.028) (0.301) (3.833) 
Time Since the Launch of Service OnAir -0.179 1.134 1.830 
  (1.189) (0.886) (1.512) 
     
R2  0.202 0.099 0.101 
Observations  1314 1220 1029 
Clusters  91 91 82 
Functional Form  linear linear linear 
Estimation Method  FE FD FE IV 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses  
operator-specific effects suppressed     
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Table 5. Cellphone usage estimation results with diffusion stage interaction terms 
Dependent variable: Avg. Minutes of 
Use MoU (1) (2) (3) 
Price Effects:     
Own Price CellP(j) -2.338*** -1.658*** -3.537*** 
  (0.445) (0.345) (0.940) 
Avg. Price of Mobile Competitors CellP(-j) 0.681** 0.073 1.053 
  (0.283) (0.153) (0.961) 
Price of Local Fixed-Line Connection FixedP 0.300 0.875 -12.075 
  (1.492) (0.664) (7.465) 
Installed Base Effects:     
Own Penetration CellSubs(j) -2.354** -2.399*** -3.125** 
  (1.145) (0.659) (1.551) 
Penetration of Mobile Competitors CellSubs(-j) 0.571 -0.036 0.385 
  (0.627) (0.297) (0.634) 
Penetration of Fixed Line FixedSubs -2.259*** -1.396 -4.104*** 
  (0.874) (0.951) (1.348) 
Controls:     
Share of Own Prepay Users Prepay -0.943*** -0.125 -1.028*** 
  (0.209) (0.114) (0.346) 
GDP GDP 4.056*** 1.526*** 6.458* 
  (0.902) (0.301) (3.912) 
Time Since the Launch of Service OnAir -0.623 1.159 1.481 
  (0.938) (0.880) (1.101) 
Interactions with Stage:     
Own Price * Stage 
CellP(j) * 
Stage -1.964** -0.178 -0.200 
  (0.859) (0.370) (0.774) 
Avg. Price of Mobile Competitors * 
Stage 
CellP(-j) * 
Stage 0.091 -0.074 -0.363 
  (0.777) (0.295) (0.688) 
Price of Local Fixed-Line Connection * 
Stage 
FixedP * 
Stage -1.059 -0.135 -1.750* 
  (0.808) (0.369) (1.006) 
Penetration of Mobile Competitors * 
Stage 
CellSubs(j) * 
Stage 0.840 0.783** 0.950 
  (0.692) (0.348) (0.853) 
Penetration of Fixed Line * Stage 
CellSubs(-j) * 
Stage -0.256 -0.107 -0.592* 
  (0.378) (0.118) (0.335) 
Share of Own Prepay Users * Stage 
FixedSubs * 
Stage 1.186*** 0.007 0.719*** 
  (0.262) (0.093) (0.255) 
     
R2  0.322 0.109 0.179 
Observations  1314 1220 1029 
Clusters  91 91 82 
Functional Form  linear linear linear 
Estimation Method  FE FD FE IV 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses  
operator-specific effects suppressed     
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Table A1. Cellphone usage estimation results (alternative functional forms) 
Dep. Variable: MoU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Effects:       
CellP(j) -0.015*** -0.578*** -0.012*** -0.410*** -0.029*** -0.243 
 (0.002) (0.096) (0.002) (0.060) (0.007) (0.482) 
CellP(-j) 0.005** 0.021 0.002 0.062 0.004 -0.081 
 (0.002) (0.087) (0.001) (0.038) (0.006) (0.460) 
FixedP -0.005 -0.045 0.005 -0.045 -0.046 0.374 
 (0.009) (0.064) (0.004) (0.040) (0.032) (0.376) 
Installed Base Effects:       
CellSubs(j) -0.004 -0.094 -0.007** -0.019 -0.010* -0.038 
 (0.004) (0.066) (0.003) (0.020) (0.005) (0.041) 
CellSubs(-j) -0.000 -0.230*** -0.003** -0.141*** -0.006** -0.162 
 (0.003) (0.059) (0.001) (0.024) (0.003) (0.123) 
FixedSubs -0.019*** -0.032 -0.010** 0.015 -0.025*** -0.443 
 (0.007) (0.308) (0.005) (0.216) (0.008) (0.462) 
Controls:       
Prepay -0.005*** -0.049* -0.001** -0.034** -0.006*** 0.034 
 (0.001) (0.029) (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.079) 
GDP 0.019*** 0.590*** 0.010*** 0.235*** 0.040*** 0.207 
 (0.005) (0.093) (0.002) (0.050) (0.015) (0.276) 
OnAir -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.016 0.005 -0.053 
 (0.005) (0.041) (0.004) (0.029) (0.006) (0.077) 
       
R2 0.321 0.417 0.184 0.243 0.211 0.307 
Observations 1314 965 1220 888 1029 730 
Clusters 91 74 91 74 82 61 
Functional Form log-lin log-log log-lin log-log log-lin log-log 
Estimation Method FE FE FD FD FE IV FE IV 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses   
operator-specific effects suppressed      
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Table A2. Cellphone usage estimation results with diffusion stage interaction terms  
 (alternative functional forms) 
Dep. Variable: MoU (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Effects:       
CellP(j) -0.014*** -0.444*** -0.012*** -0.391*** -0.027*** 0.034 
 (0.003) (0.154) (0.003) (0.064) (0.006) (0.552) 
CellP(-j) 0.006*** 0.054 0.003 0.092* 0.006 -0.285 
 (0.002) (0.103) (0.002) (0.054) (0.005) (0.487) 
FixedP 0.008 0.006 0.004 -0.035 -0.042 0.305 
 (0.008) (0.079) (0.004) (0.049) (0.037) (0.411) 
Installed Base Effects:       
CellSubs(j) -0.011** -0.085 -0.008*** -0.009 -0.018** -0.045 
 (0.006) (0.072) (0.003) (0.024) (0.007) (0.051) 
CellSubs(-j) 0.000 -0.146 -0.003** -0.138*** -0.003 -0.071 
 (0.003) (0.092) (0.001) (0.031) (0.003) (0.103) 
FixedSubs -0.018*** -0.158 -0.010* -0.088 -0.025*** -0.677 
 (0.006) (0.345) (0.005) (0.232) (0.009) (0.563) 
Controls:       
Prepay -0.004*** -0.068** -0.001** -0.028* -0.006*** 0.018 
 (0.001) (0.027) (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.073) 
GDP 0.021*** 0.599*** 0.010*** 0.257*** 0.041** 0.316 
 (0.004) (0.095) (0.002) (0.055) (0.017) (0.266) 
OnAir -0.003 0.015 0.006* 0.036 0.004 -0.016 
 (0.005) (0.050) (0.004) (0.028) (0.005) (0.093) 
Interaction terms:       
CellP(j) * Stage -0.010** -0.170 -0.000 -0.015 -0.000 -0.297 
 (0.004) (0.116) (0.002) (0.058) (0.004) (0.236) 
CellP(-j) * Stage -0.001 -0.039 -0.001 -0.051 -0.004 0.128 
 (0.003) (0.095) (0.002) (0.038) (0.004) (0.187) 
FixedP * Stage -0.000 -0.010 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.023 
 (0.005) (0.061) (0.002) (0.030) (0.005) (0.081) 
CellSubs(j) * Stage 0.005 -0.040 0.001 -0.023* 0.006 -0.029 
 (0.004) (0.036) (0.001) (0.012) (0.004) (0.035) 
CellSubs(-j) * Stage -0.001 -0.058 -0.002*** -0.082*** -0.002 -0.118** 
 (0.002) (0.053) (0.001) (0.023) (0.002) (0.054) 
FixedSubs * Stage 0.005*** 0.243** 0.001** 0.140*** 0.003*** 0.258** 
 (0.001) (0.114) (0.000) (0.040) (0.001) (0.104) 
       
R2 0.415 0.443 0.175 0.273 0.304 0.260 
Observations 1272 938 1179 862 1029 730 
Clusters 91 74 91 74 82 61 
Functional Form log-lin log-log log-lin log-log log-lin log-log 
Estimation Method FE FE FD FD FE IV FE IV 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses   
operator-specific effects suppressed      
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